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ABSTRACT
This thesis introduces VMCStore, a framework for developing trusted storage applications on an untrusted
server using a trusted platform module (TPM). The framework allows the server to provide trusted storage
to a large number of clients, where each client may own and use several devices that may be offline at
different times, and may not be able to communicate with each other, except through the untrusted server
(over an untrusted network). The clients only trust the server’s TPM; the server’s BIOS, CPU, and OS are
not assumed to be trusted. VMCStore draws on the ideas of virtual monotonic counters and validity proofs
to provide tamper-evident storage, allowing the user to detect modifications to his data, as well as replay
attacks. In particular, VMCStore uses TPM/J, a Java-based API for low-level access to the TPM, to create
virtual monotonic counters using the monotonic counters and transport sessions of the TPM 1.2.
VMCStore also provides a set of three log-based validation algorithms, which have been tested over
PlanetLab and analyzed in this thesis. The VMCStore framework has been developed in a modular fashion,
allowing the user to develop and test new applications and validation algorithms.
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1 Introduction
This thesis presents VMCStore, a framework for developing trusted storage applications on an untrusted
server using a trusted platform module (TPM). In particular, VMCStore provides the user with a framework
for using an untrusted server with a trusted platform module (TPM) to provide trusted storage for a large
number of clients, where each client may own and use several different devices that may be offline at
different times and may not be able to communicate with each other except through the untrusted server
(over an untrusted network)[45]1. This idea was first presented in [35], and expanded upon in [45]; this
thesis presents an implementation of these ideas, and analyzes the limitations of this approach in real-life
scenarios.
The research presented in this thesis is driven by two primary motivations:
a Promoting the TPM
The TPM is still a relatively new technology. Recently, a number of applications have been devel-
oped, providing a range of TPM-based services, from file and folder encryption [15], to file system
tamper-detection [33], to full-volume encryption [30]. However, the TPM still requires a more solid
application base to gain greater recognition and evolve into a critical component of modern com-
puter systems. Therefore, one goal of VMCStore is to demonstrate trusted storage as another possible
application of the current version of the TPM (1.2).
b Developing New Trusted Storage Applications
Since the TPM is not as susceptible to external software attacks as traditional software-based cryp-
tographic service providers [44], it is possible that a TPM-based trusted storage system would make
certain applications more feasible. Another goal of VMCStore, then, is to encourage the pursuit of
new trusted storage applications, which could help the TPM find a pervasive role in society. By ma-
nipulating the roles of the client and the server, many new applications can be imagined, ranging from
peer-to-peer systems, to count-limited certificates and DRM [45, 35].
With these two motivations in mind, the VMCStore system has been developed as a modular framework,
allowing the user to manipulate and extend the system to develop and test new algorithms and applications.
Four log-based validation algorithms are included as examples of how to use the VMCStore framework.
1For more a more detailed discussion of the problem statement, please refer to the Problem Statement section of [45].
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The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 first presents an overview of work and systems
related to VMCStore. The abstract system model and protocols behind VMCStore, adapted from [45], are
then presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides an overview of the VMCStore system. This is followed by
a description of how the theoretical data structures are implemented in VMCStore, in Section 5, followed
by an analysis of the four log-based validation algorithms in Section 6. Future directions of VMCStore are
considered along with the conclusion of the thesis in Section 7.
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2 Related Work
Protecting and validating the integrity of data storage has been a well studied topic due mainly to its high
importance to a wide range of applications. For this, cryptographic one-way hash functions [11] are often
used by a client to create a small local checksum of large remote data. Merkle proposed hash trees (authen-
tication trees) as a means to update and validate data hashes efficiently by maintaining a tree of hash values
over the objects [28]. Recent systems [10, 13, 9, 22, 26] make a more distinct separation between untrusted
storage and a trusted compute base (TCB), which can be a trusted machine or a trusted coprocessor. These
systems run a trusted program on the TCB (usually a trusted machine or machine with a trusted coprocessor)
that uses hash trees to maintain the integrity of data stored on an untrusted storage. The untrusted storage is
typically some arbitrarily large, easily accessible, bulk store in which the program regularly stores and loads
data which does not fit in a cache in the TCB.
The work on certificate authentication trees in [17] has led to the introduction of authenticated dictio-
naries [32] and authenticated search trees [4, 3]. In the model of authenticated dictionaries, a trusted source
maintains all the data which is replicated over multiple untrusted directories. Whenever the trusted source
performs an update, it transmits the update to the untrusted directories. The data is maintained in an authen-
ticated tree structure whose root is signed together with a timestamp by the trusted source. If a user/client
queries an untrusted directory, then it uses the tree structure and the signed root to verify the result. A per-
sistent authenticated dictionary [1, 14, 23, 24] maintains multiple versions of its contents as it is modified.
Timeline entanglement [25] creates a tamper-evident historic record of different persistent authenticated
dictionaries maintained by mutually distrusting sources.
Byzantine-fault-tolerant file systems [7, 8] consist of storage state machines that are replicated across
different nodes in a distributed system. The system provides tamper-evidence and recovery from tampering,
but both properties rely on the assumption that at least two-thirds of the replicas will be honest. The ex-
pectation is that replicas are weakly protected, and possibly hostile, so the difficulty of an adversary taking
over k hosts increases significantly with k. Byzantine-fault-tolerant file systems distribute trust but assume
a threshold fraction of honest servers.
SUNDR [27, 20] is another general-purpose, multi-user network file system that uses untrusted storage
servers. SUNDR protects against forking attacks, which is a form of attack where a server uses a replay
attack to give different users a different view of the current state of the system. SUNDR does not prevent
10
forking attacks, but guarantees fork consistency, which essentially ensures that the system server either
behaves correctly, or that its failure or malicious behavior will be detected later when users are able to
communicate with each other. This is achieved by basing the authority to write a file on the public keys
of each user. Plutus [16] is another efficient storage system for untrusted servers that cannot handle these
forking attacks.
In our system, we place a small TCB in the form of a TPM at an untrusted third party. This TCB is
used to maintain virtual counters for timestamping, which allows client devices to immediately (without the
need to communicate with any of the other client’s devices) detect server misbehavior whenever a critical
operation needs to be performed. In our system, server misbehavior also includes replay attacks. Since
replay attacks and other server misbehavior can be detected immediately, forking attacks are prevented, and
data freshness, integrity, and consistency is guaranteed.
We reduce the trusted computing base to only a single TPM 1.2 [43, 31], which is a standard component
on machines today. This differs from many other systems that require complex secure processors [38, 2, 21,
46, 40, 41, 39].
We use the TPM as a secure counter which can be used to timestamp events according to their causal
relations. An order in logical time can be extracted if we know which events logically cause other events.
Lamport clocks [18, 19] are conceptual devices for reasoning about event ordering. Our scenario with a
centralized untrusted third party which implements a virtual counter manager with access to the TPM does
not need Lamport clocks to reason about logical time. Our difficulty is how to reason about malicious
behavior.
For completeness we mention that in accountable time-stamping systems [5, 6] all forgeries can be
explicitly proven and all false accusations explicitly disproven; it is intractable for anybody to create a pair
of contradictory attestations. Buldas et al. [4] introduced a primitive called undeniable attester. Informally,
the attester is such that it is intractable to generate both a positive and a negative attestation based on an
element x and a set S such that the attester concludes x ∈ S for the positive attestation and x 6∈ S for the
negative attestation. Their intention is to prove the existence or non-existence of objects in a database. An
authenticated search tree [17, 32, 4, 3] can be used for the construction of an undeniable attester.
One technique also worth noting is that described by Schneier and Kelsey for securing audit logs on
untrusted machines [36, 37]. Each log entry contains an element in a linear hash chain that serves to check
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the integrity of the values of all previous log entries. It is this element that is actually kept in trusted storage,
which makes it possible to verify all previous log entries by trusting a single hash value. The technique is
suitable for securing append-only data that is read sequentially by a verifying trusted computer.
Another concept worth noting is that of a certificate revocation list (CRL), which is a list signed by a
certification authority (CA) together with a timestamp. By obtaining the most recent CRL, one can easily
verify whether a certificate is still valid. Based on CRLs, less communication intensive solutions are pro-
posed in [29, 17, 32]. In [29] the idea is proposed to sign a message for every certificate stating whether it
is revoked or not, and to use an off-line/on-line signature scheme [12] to improve the efficiency. The idea to
use a log of certificates in which each of the certificates attests to a positive or a negative action is a general
principle which we also use in our approach (we use a log of increment certificates in which each of the
increment certificates attests to whether a certain virtual monotonic counter has been incremented or not).
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3 Abstract System Model and Protocols
The VMCStore system is a proof-of-concept implementation based on ideas proposed by Luis Sarmenta and
Marten van Dijk in the Computation Structures Group of CSAIL at MIT. The following section is adapted
from [45], and provides an overview of the theory behind virtual monotonic counters and validity proofs,
and how they can be used to build a trusted storage system. The relationship between the abstract structures
and protocols and implemented classes are explained in Section 5. Implementation details of the system
model are explained in Section 4.
To provide some context for the following section, note that the virtual monotonic counters will be built
on top of the monotonic counters included in the TPM 1.2. According to the TPM 1.2 specification, while
the TPM may contain multiple monotonic counters, only one may be used during a particular boot-cycle
[43]. Because of this, we will need a module to act as a manager to virtualize this resource. This module is
called the virtual counter manager.
3.1 Virtual Counter Manager
In order to implement a virtual counter manager based on TPM 1.2 we use one of the TPM’s built-in physical
monotonic counters as a “global clock”. Essentially, we use the TPM with its global clock as a timestamping
device to timestamp each virtual counter. Whenever we wish to increment a virtual counter, we increment
the global clock and timestamp the virtual counter’s ID with the incremented value of the global clock. We
then define the value of a specific virtual counter as the value of its most recent timestamp. In other words,
the value of a particular virtual counter is defined as the value of the global clock at the last time that the
virtual counter’s increment protocol was invoked.
Note that this results in non-deterministic monotonic virtual counters [35]. The unpredictability of the
virtual counter’s increments relative to the global clock means that a client needs to check every increment
that is performed on the global clock.2 That is, in order to verify whether a retrieved virtual counter value
is fresh and valid, the client’s device needs to examine a log of timestamps that resulted from increments
on the global clock. Checking each timestamp determines whether the client’s particular virtual counter has
been incremented (i.e., timestamped by the global clock) more recently. This is because these applications
only need to be able to tell if the value of a monotonic counter has changed from its previous value or not.
2Except when using time-multiplexing, which is described in Section 3.5.
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It does not matter what the new value is, as long as it is different from any other value in the past [35].
In the following section, we explain the details of our log-based scheme based on this idea. We first
explain how to use a TPM 1.2 chip to implement two global clock primitives: IncAndSignClock − which
increments and signs the resulting global clock value together with an input nonce, and ReadAndSignClock
− which reads and signs the current value of the global clock together with an input nonce. We then show
how these primitives can be used to implement read and increment protocols for individual virtual counters.
3.2 Global Clock Operations Using TPM 1.2
A TPM 1.2 chip has three features which are useful for our purposes. First, the TPM has the ability to hold
an attestation identity key (AIK), which is a unique signing keypair whose private key is never revealed
outside the TPM, and whose public key is certified by a trusted third party (and can be verified through
this certificate without contacting the trusted third party). Second, the TPM has at least one built-in (or
“physical”) monotonic counter whose value is non-volatile (i.e., it persists through reboots), and monotonic
(i.e., it can be increased by 1, but it can never be reverted to an older value, even if one has complete physical
access to the entire machine hosting and invoking the TPM). Third, the TPM supports exclusive and logged
transport sessions, which allow the TPM to prove to an external party that it has executed certain operations
(atomically) by signing (with the AIK) a log of the operations performed on the TPM together with their
inputs and outputs and an anti-replay nonce. These features allow us to implement our schemes by using the
TPM’s built-in monotonic counter as the global clock, and using the AIK and transport sessions to produce
trusted signatures, or timestamps, using this global clock.
Specifically, we implement the IncAndSignClock(nonce) primitive by using the TPM’s built-in TPM In-
crement Counter command (which increments the TPM’s built-in monotonic counter) inside an exclusive
and logged transport session using the AIK as the signing key. This produces a signature over a data structure
that includes the anti-replay nonce and a hash of the transport session log, which consists of the inputs,
commands, and outputs encountered during the entire transport session. This signature can then be used
together with the input nonce nonce and the transport session log, to construct an increment certificate.
Note that by making this transport session exclusive, we ensure that the TPM will not allow other exclusive
transport sessions to successfully execute at the same time. This ensures the atomicity of the increment
operation.
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The verification algorithm for such an increment certificate is as follows: First, it checks that the nonce
in the certificate is the same as the input nonce. If they are the same, the input nonce nonce together with
the transport log, the signed output, and the certified public key of the TPM’s AIK is used to verify the
certificate. Finally, if the certificate verifies as valid, the algorithm retrieves the global clock’s value, which
is included in the transport session log of inputs and outputs as part of the certificate.
The ReadAndSignClock(nonce) primitive is implemented like the IncAndSignClock(nonce) primitive
where the TPM Increment Counter command in the transport session is replaced by the TPM’s built-in
TPM Read Counter command. In this case, instead of an increment certificate, we produce a current
global clock certificate certifying the current value of the global clock (i.e., TPM’s built-in monotonic
counter).
3.3 Log-Based Scheme Protocols Overview
We begin by assuming that each client has her own unique public-private key pair stored in each of her
devices. A client’s devices use the client’s private key to sign increment requests and create confirmation
certificates. Confirmation certificates are produced and given to the virtual counter manager whenever a
client’s device successfully performs a read or increment with validation, as defined below.
On the manager-side, we assume that the virtual counter manager has a certified trusted TPM 1.2 chip,
and some software, memory, and persistent (e.g., disk) storage, which can all be untrusted. The software on
the virtual counter manager keeps track of:
1 an array of the most recent confirmation certificates for each virtual counter, and
2 an array of each of the increment certificates which were generated since the generation of the oldest
most recent confirmation certificate.
Using these, together with the TPM and the global clock operations described earlier, the virtual counter
manager implements four protocols for operating on individual virtual counters:
1 Increment-without-validation (aka Fast-Increment), in which a client’s device requests to increment
one of the client’s virtual counters, and which results in an increment certificate,
2 Read-without-validation (aka Fast-Read), in which the virtual counter manager returns the current
value of a virtual counter,
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3 Read-with-validation (aka Full-Read), in which not only the current value of a virtual counter is
returned, but also a proof of the validity of this virtual counter, and
4 Increment-with-validation (aka Full-Increment), which combines the increment-without-validation
and read-with-validation protocols into a single protocol.
The read and increment protocols with validation produce a validity proof , which is composed of:
1 the most recent confirmation certificate of the corresponding virtual counter, together with
2 a list (or log) of each of the increment certificates which were generated since the creation of this most
recent confirmation certificate, and
3 a current global clock certificate or a new increment certificate.
Given these, a client can reconstruct the global clock values at which the virtual counter was incremented
since the creation of the most recent confirmation certificate. This reconstruction detects any malicious
behavior in the past. Specifically, the reconstruction of past increments is used to determine whether the
virtual counter values on which these increments were based are valid. That is, as described in (5) below,
for each of the past increments by any of the client’s devices, the client checks whether the increment was
based on a retrieved counter value (received from the virtual counter manager during one of its protocols)
that is equal to the current counter value just prior to the increment. This check is made possible by having
an increment certificate also certify the value on which the corresponding increment is based (hence, the
consistency of the reconstructed list of increments can be verified).
We note that in order to verify the freshness of data it is sufficient to verify the validity of the counter
values on which past increments were based, since only newly incremented values are used for timestamping
data in our virtual storage application.
3.4 Protocol Details
We proceed with the details of the different protocols:
Increment-without-Validation protocol: Figure 1.a shows the interaction between a client device, the
virtual counter manager, and its TPM during an increment-without-validation protocol. If a client’s device
16
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Figure 1: Protocols. (a) Increment-without-Validation. (b) Read-with-Validation. (Note: Increment-with-
Validation is similar to Read-with-Validation, except that an increment operation is performed and the in-
crement certificate is used in place of the current global clock certificate.)
wants to increment one of the client’s virtual counters, then it selects a random anti-replay nonce antiReplay
and concatenates the anti-replay nonce, the counter identity ctrID of the virtual counter which needs to be
incremented, and the current value ctrV al of this counter according to the knowledge of the client’s device.
Let SK be the client’s secret key. The device computes
nonce = (conc‖SignSK(conc)) where conc = (antiReplay‖ctrID‖ctrV al). (1)
The nonce is forwarded to the virtual counter manager with the request to use nonce as the input nonce
of the IncAndSignClock primitive (step 1 in Figure 1.a). Besides verifying the nonce’s signature, the virtual
counter manager checks whether the current value of the counter with identity ctrID is equal to ctrV al.
If not, then the virtual counter manager notifies the client’s device about its out-of-date knowledge. If
ctrV al does match the current counter value, then the virtual counter manager uses the TPM to execute
IncAndSignClock(nonce) (step 2 in Figure 1.a) and the resulting increment certificate is sent back to the
client’s (step 3 in Figure 1.a) device, which verifies the certificate. In this scheme we do not protect against
denial of service; if the increment certificate does not arrive within a certain time interval, then the client’s
device should retransmit its request with the same nonce. As soon as an increment certificate is accepted
(that is, its verification passed in step 4 in Figure 1.a), the client’s device may use the new counter value to
timestamp data. If the client’s device accepts the increment certificate, then we call the increment successful.
Since the anti-replay nonce is chosen at random, replay attacks of previously generated increment certifi-
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cates (by, for example, a malicious virtual counter manager or a man-in-the-middle) will be detected by the
client’s device. We will show that the validity of a client’s virtual counter can be verified in the read-with-
validation protocol (even in the presence of a malicious virtual counter manager, but with a trusted TPM)
because the client’s device’s knowledge of the current counter value ctrV al is included in the input nonce
of the IncAndSignClock primitive. The role of the counter ID in the input nonce is to distinguish which
increment certificates correspond to which virtual counters. The nonce’s signature proves the authenticity
of the request to the virtual counter manager. The signature is also used in the read-with-validation protocol
to prove that each increment certificate originated from an authentic request and not a fake increment.
Read-without-Validation protocol: In the read-without-validation protocol, a client’s device asks for the
most recent value of a specific virtual counter. The virtual counter manager simply signs and returns the
most recent counter value without making use of the TPM.
Read-with-Validation protocol: Figure 1.b shows the interaction between a client device, the virtual
counter manager, and its TPM during a read-with-validation protocol. If a client’s device wants to read
and obtain a validity proof of the value of one of the client’s virtual counters, it first selects a random anti-
replay nonce antiReplay. Let ctrID be the counter ID of the virtual counter which current value needs to
be returned by the protocol. The concatenation,
nonce = (antiReplay‖ctrID),
is forwarded to the virtual counter manager (step 1 in Figure 1.b) with the request to use it as the input
nonce of the ReadAndSignClock primitive. The virtual counter manager uses the TPM to execute ReadAnd-
SignClock(nonce) (step 2 in Figure 1.b). The resulting current global clock certificate is transmitted to the
client’s device together with the most recent confirmation certificate of the virtual counter, ctrID, and a log
of each of the increment certificates generated since the creation of this most recent confirmation certificate
(step 3 in Figure 1.b). The sequence of certificates in this transmission form a validity proof as depicted in
Figure 2.
The most recent confirmation certificate is a certificate generated by one the client’s devices during a
previous read-with-validation or increment-with-validation protocol. It is a certificate of the concatenation
of ctrID, the value globClk′ of the global clock at the time when either protocol was executed, and the
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Figure 2: The Validation Process. After receiving the validity proof, the client checks the AIK signatures
on all the increment certificates, extracts the certificates with increments for its counter ID, and verifies that
each increment was done with the correct knowledge of the previous value of the virtual counter. If this
validation succeeds, the client produces a new confirmation certificate.
value ctrV al′ of the counter with identity ctrID at the time when either protocol was executed. That is, the
confirmation certificate is a pair
(confirm,SignSK(confirm)) where confirm = (ctrID‖ctrV al′‖globClk′) (2)
and SK is the client’s secret key.
Let globClk be the global clock value as certified by the current global clock certificate. Since the anti-
replay nonce is chosen at random, replay attacks of previously generated current global clock certificates
will be detected by the client’s device. Therefore, we may assume that globClk represents the current global
clock value.
The client’s device also verifies each of the signatures in the log of increment certificates (which were
generated since the creation of this most recent confirmation certificate), and uses the client’s public key to
verify the confirmation certificate. Then, for each value t in the range
globClk′ < t < globClk, (3)
there should exist an increment certificate for which its verification algorithm retrieves the value t (see
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the log of increment certificates in Figure 2). See (1), let
conct = (antiReplayt‖ctrIDt‖ctrV alt) (4)
be part of the input nonce of the increment certificate for t. The list of these input nonces contains a
sublist of input nonces with ctrIDt = ctrID (see the sublist of increment certificates in Figure 2). The
sublist of these input nonces corresponds to all the increments of the counter with identity ctrID during
the period where the global clock value ranged from globClk′ to the current global clock value globClk.
According to (1), each of the input nonces within the sublist contains within itself a signature that can be
verified by using the client’s public key. This allows the client to confirm that the corresponding increment
certificates originated from an authentic request and not a fake increment.
The sublist can also be used by the client’s device to detect whether the increments are based on valid
counter values. Using (4), let ctrV alt be one of the values in the input nonce within the sublist. Then,
counter value t resulted from an increment protocol which was initiated by one of the client’s devices who
thought that, just before the start of the increment protocol, the value of the counter is equal to ctrV alt.
Hence, if the counter with identity ctrID has behaved like a valid counter, then, for each pair of consecutive
input nonces with ctrV alt and ctrV alT , t < T , within the sublist,
t should be equal to ctrV alT . (5)
If this check passes, then the last value ctrV al within the sublist is the current value of the virtual
counter, ctrID, and the client’s device transmits to the virtual counter manager (step 5 in Figure 1) a new
confirmation certificate, described in (2), in which
confirm = (ctrID‖ctrV al‖globClk).
Increment-with-Validation protocol: The increment-with-validation protocol first executes the increment-
without validation protocol. The resulting increment certificate contains the current global clock value as
the incremented virtual counter value. In this sense, the increment certificate can also function as a current
global clock certificate. The increment certificate can then be used in the read-with-validation protocol, in
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place of the ReadAndSignClock primitive, to provide the validity proof for increment-with-validation.
3.5 Improvements
In this subsection we explain two techniques that can be used to improve the performance of the log-based
scheme. The details of both techniques are presented in Appendix A of [45].
Sharing. One problem with the log-based scheme as described so far is that each read and increment
primitive on a virtual counter requires the TPM to produce a signature using its AIK. As we will show
in Section 6, read and increment signature operations typically takes around 1.3s using existing TPM 1.2
chips today. Moreover, TPM 1.2 chips also throttle increment operations on the TPM’s built-in monotonic
counter to prevent wear-down of the TPM’s nonvolatile memory. This means that increment operations are
only possible once every 2 to 5 seconds (depending on the manufacturer). As we will show in Sect. 6, if
we only allow one virtual counter to be incremented for each increment of the global counter, then a single
TPM can only handle a few virtual counters before the overall performance becomes unacceptably slow.
A solution to this problem is to allow multiple increment protocols of independent virtual counters to
be executed at the same time, sharing a single global clock primitive. The general idea here is to collect the
individual nonces of each increment protocol and to construct a single shared nonce which can then be used
as an input to a single shared IncAndSignClock primitive.
Time-Multiplexing. The log-based scheme has another significant drawback: if a virtual counter v is not
incremented while other counters are incremented many times, then the validity proof for v would need to
include the log of all increments of all counters (not just v) since the last increment of v. The length of this
log can quickly grow very large.
A solution to this problem is to time-multiplex the global clock. That is, instead of allowing increments
at each possible global clock value for each client, each client associates with each of his virtual counters
a fixed schedule of global clock values that are allowed to be virtual counter values. The main advantage
of time multiplexing is that the log of increment certificates in a validity proof of a virtual counter can
be reduced to those for which the corresponding verification algorithm retrieves a value which is allowed,
according to the schedule of the virtual counter.
The disadvantage of time-multiplexing is a possible increase in the latency between the request and
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finish of an increment. In order to reduce the effects of this problem we may use an adaptive schedule.
Under this scheme, a virtual counter’s schedule is allowed to change. For example, the client’s devices may
agree to a back-off strategy. Immediately after a successful increment, the legal increment slots for a virtual
counter would be close together. As the client’s virtual counter remains idle, the legal increment slots are
spaced farther and farther apart according to a known deterministic formula.
Finally, note that while there is an advantage to multiplexing increments, the same advantage does not
apply to counter reads. Reads do not increase the length of the validity proof, so multiplexing them will not
reduce the size of the read certificate. In fact, delaying reads by multiplexing may increase the size of the
validity proof by allowing more clients to perform increments before the validity proof is generated. For
these reasons, reads in the time-multiplexed scheme are not multiplexed, but handled on-demand.
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4 Implementation
From an implementation point-of-view, the main goal of VMCStore is to develop and analyze various TPM-
based trusted storage algorithms specified in [45], and discussed in Section 3. However, the system itself
has been developed with a very modular design in mind, with the hope that this framework can be used to
experiment with and test future algorithms as well. This section will give an overview of the various modules
of VMCStore, and how they interact with each other. More information on data structures referenced in this
section can be found in Section 5.
4.1 System Overview
VMCStore is written using Java 1.5 and TPM/J. TPM/J is an object-oriented API using Java for low-level
access to the TPM [34]. While VMCStore is portable to any operating system capable of running a JVM,
TPM-compatibility is the responsibility of TPM/J. At present, TPM/J has been shown to work under Win-
dows XP, Linux, Mac OS X, and Windows Vista.
The VMCStore framework is divided into four primary modules: CounterHost, CounterGateway, Com-
munication, and Client. The fifth module, Simulation, is any higher-level user or application that wishes to
interact with the trusted storage system. The sixth module, Storage, is not specified by VMCStore, since it
is heavily application-dependent. The interaction among these six modules can be seen in (Figure 3).
• CounterHost: Manages the actual incrementing and reading of the counters (e.g., the virtual mono-
tonic counters implemented on the TPM 1.2).
• CounterGateway: Manages access to the CounterHost, directing client request threads to the appro-
priate timeslot.
• Communication: Manages the marshaling and unmarshaling of requests and responses between the
Client and the CounterGateway. Two implementations have been included, providing communication
over sockets or RMI.
• Client: Provides an interface between the user and the CounterHost, managing counter information,
marshaling requests, and verifying proofs of freshness. If a Storage server is present, the Client will
usually manage sending and retrieving files and timestamps from the storage server.
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• Simulation: The user or application that interacts with the VMCStore framework. The package in-
cluded in VMCStore imitates the user, providing a way to perform distributed experiments for col-
lecting data and statistics about system performance.
• Storage: Stores the user data with the appropriate timestamp from the CounterHost. The Storage
server is application-dependent.
As mentioned previously, VMCStore has been implemented with the goal of allowing the user to exper-
iment and test his own algorithms. The algorithms discussed in Section 5.4 have been included as examples,
and are referenced below by their collective package name, logbased. Sample communication protocols
(e.g., RMI, sockets) have also been included. However, any of these modules can be swapped-out with user
defined modules and algorithms.
4.2 CounterHost
The CounterHost manages the lowest-level interaction with the counters (e.g., reading and incrementing),
as well as the creation of validity proofs for the client.
4.2.1 Interfaces
The key interface for this module is CounterHost. Three methods are defined by the interface, closely
following the protocol defined in Section 3.4.
• ReadCertificate readCounter(ByteArrayable nonce, ByteArrayable counterID):
Returns a ReadCertificate for the specified virtual counter, using the given nonce. ReadCertificate is a
wrapper interface which extends CountStamp, and should include the signed counter information from
a TPM read operation. The ReadCertificate may contain additional information, such as a validity
proof.
• IncCertificate incrementCounter(ByteArrayable nonce, ByteArrayable counterID):
Returns an IncCertificate for the specified virtual counter, using the given nonce. IncCertificate is
a wrapper interface which extends CountStamp, and should include the signed counter information
from a TPM increment operation. For increment-with-validation operations, the IncCertificate should
also contain a validity proof.
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Figure 3: Modular diagram of the VMCStore system. The classes listed inside the modules are examples
of those included for the logbased algorithms. Other possible combinations (e.g. using sockets in place of
RMI) are included with VMCStore.
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• void sendConfirmationCertificate(ConfCertificate cert):
Provides a way for clients to send confirmation certificates to the virtual counter manager (Counter-
Host). ConfCertificates, defined in Section 5.2, include the identity of the virtual counter, the time
of the last successful increment, and a CountStamp defining the current time of the confirmation cer-
tificate. The ConfCertificate is also signed by the client, and provides a verifyCertificate method to
confirm its validity.
4.2.2 Log-based Implementation
The logbased package provides a LogCounterHostFactory, which should be used to create LogCounterHost
instances that follow the increment, read, and validation protocols defined by the algorithms in Sections 3.4
and 3.5. Available algorithms are defined by the LogAlgorithm enum.
The LogCounterHostFactory provides one method for creating LogCounterHost instances: getLogCoun-
terHostInstance(). This method requires a LogAlgorithm enum, as well as a TPM driver, the global counter
ID, and a signing key.
TPMCountStampHost provides a thin layer between the LogCounterHost and the TPM/J CountStamp
functions. Both the read and increment operations of the TPMCountStampHost return a TPMCountStamp.
Since the TPMCountStamp is operation-independent, and implements neither ReadCertificate nor IncCer-
tificate, the TPMCountStampHost is not a true CounterHost. However, this class is simply intended as a
wrapper and is never exposed to the LogCounterGateway.
4.3 CounterGateway
The CounterGateway sits between the clients and the CounterHost. It manages client requests, and is re-
sponsible for ensuring that clients only perform increments during legal increment timeslots.
4.3.1 Interfaces
The CounterGateway interface provides three methods, which closely mirror the CounterHost interface
methods. The CounterGateway methods prepackage the return data for network communication (see Section
4.4.2):
26
• ByteArrayableWrapperInterface <ReadCertificate> readCounterRemote(ByteArrayableWrapperInterface<?
extends ByteArrayable> counterID, ByteArrayableWrapperInterface<? extends ByteArrayable> nonce)
• ByteArrayableWrapperInterface<IncCertificate> incrementCounter(ByteArrayableWrapperInterface<?
extends ByteArrayable> counterID, ByteArrayableWrapperInterface<? extends ByteArrayable> nonce)
• void sendConfirmationCertificate(ByteArrayableWrapperInterface<? extends ConfCertificate>)
CounterGateway extends CommunicationGateway, removing the throws IOException clauses included
by its super-interface (see Section 4.4).
4.3.2 Log-based Implementation
The logbased package provides a LogCounterGatewayFactory, which should be used to create LogCounter-
Host instances that follow the algorithms defined in Section 5.4. The LogCounterGatewayFactory provides
one method for creating LogCounterGateway instances: getLogCounterGatewayInstance(LogAlgorithm,
LogCounterHost).
The LogCounterGateway implementations are all multi-threaded, treating each thread as a separate
client. Operations are broken down into timeslots, and all threads scheduled for a given timeslot are al-
lowed to proceed together. This allows the LogCounterGateway to collect together individual nonces to
form a shared nonce, and parallelize the usage of TPM resources.
The Multiplexed and Adaptive algorithms require a further extension to this threading structure. Since
clients must wait for a legal timeslot before their increment can complete, a dummy thread is included which
increments the TPM when no other clients are available. This ensures that clients will never wait indefinitely
for their timeslot to arrive.
The implementations of LogCounterGateway included in logbased also perform simple resource maxi-
mization by alternating increments and reads whenever possible. As discussed in section 6, TPM’s typically
require a cool-down period between increments to extend the life of the TPM’s non-volatile RAM. Reads,
however, can still be performed during this cool-down period. We found that alternating reads and incre-
ments provides good TPM utilization for the TPM’s we have worked with.
LogCounterGateway also implements the CounterHost and SimulationGateway interfaces. Because they
are intended to be used for simulation, the increment and read methods of LogCounterGateway also return
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instances of StatPackagedCertificates, instead of ByteArrayableWrappers. More information on the Simu-
lationGateway interface and StatPackagedCertificates can be found in section 4.6.
4.4 Communication
Communication is responsible for marshaling and unmarshaling requests and responses between the Client
and the CounterGateway.
4.4.1 Interfaces
The primary communication interface is CommunicationGateway. This is the super-interface for Coun-
terGateway, exposing the same methods, but also requiring implementations to include throws clauses for
IOExceptions caused by network communication.
• ByteArrayableWrapperInterface<ReadCertificate> readCounterRemote(ByteArrayableWrapperInterface<?
extends ByteArrayable> counterID, ByteArrayableWrapperInterface<? extends ByteArrayable> nonce)
throws IOException
• ByteArrayableWrapperInterface<IncCertificate> incrementCounter(ByteArrayableWrapperInterface<?
extends ByteArrayable> counterID, ByteArrayableWrapperInterface<? extends ByteArrayable> nonce)
throws IOException
• void sendConfirmationCertificate(ByteArrayableWrapperInterface<? extends ConfCertificate>) throws
IOException
There is also a SimulationCommunicationGateway which performs a function for SimulationGateway
analogous to the relationship between CommunicationGateway and CounterGateway. See Section 4.3 for
more information.
4.4.2 Sending Data Structures Over the Network: ByteArrayable
Most of the data structures defined by VMCStore implement the ByteArrayable interface defined by TPM/J
(REF). ByteArrayable objects provide toBytes() and fromBytes() methods, which can be used to reduce an
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object to a byte array, or reconstruct the object from a byte array. The ByteArrayable does not extend Seri-
alizable, so if a ByteArrayable object needs to be sent over the network, it must be reduced to a byte array,
implement Serializable, or be wrapped within an object implementing the ByteArrayableWrapperInterface.
Two classes have been included in VMCStore for wrapping ByteArrayable objects: ByteArrayableWrap-
per and StatPackagedCertificate. ByteArrayableWrapper is simply a generic wrapper for ByteArrayables;
StatPackagedCertificates are used by the Simulation modules for passing around simulation measurements
along with increment and read certificates (see Section 4.6).
4.4.3 Implementations
VMCStore contains two built-in implementations of CommunicationGateway. Both of these packages also
implement SimulationCommunicationGateway (see Section 4.6). Available implementations are defined by
the CommunicationType enum.
The Utils class contains a method, generateCommunicationGateway(), which can be used to instantiate
a CommunicationGateway from a Class object. The CommunicationGateway must expose a constructor
that takes a hostname as a String and a port as an int for this method to work.
RMI. The first implementation takes advantage of the built-in Java RMI system (REF). The counter gateway-
side class is RMIServerGateway. Java’s rmiregistry program must be running on the counter gateway ma-
chine before RMIServerGateway can be started.
The client-side class is called RMIClientGateway. It will try to find an instance of the RMIServerGate-
wayInterface on the specified host.
All experiments in Section 6 were performed using the RMI communication protocols.
Sockets. A second implementation is included which communicates directly over Java Socket objects.
Marshalling is handled by sending message objects, which extend AbstractMessage, with the necessary
parameters.
The counter gateway-side class is SocketServerGateway. This class runs as a separate thread on the
counter gateway server, accepting incoming connections and creating ServerSocketThreads. Future commu-
nication between the Client and the CounterGateway is directly between the SocketClientGateway and its
ServerSocketThread.
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The client-side class is called SocketClientGateway. It marshals requests as messages, and unmarshals
responses for the client. If the socket connection is lost, SocketClientGateway will attempt to reestablish a
connection.
While this implementation may be lighter-weight than the RMI implementation, our current implemen-
tation tends to be more fragile. Thus, we chose to use the RMI implementation for the experiments of
Section 6.
4.5 Client
The Client module provides an interface for the user or higher-level application to use the VMCStore system.
This module also marshals data so that it will be understood by the CounterHost, and verifies validity proofs
received from the CounterHost. If the system includes a StorageManager, it will also be the Client which is
responsible for communicating with the StorageManager.
4.5.1 Interfaces
The Client module defines three key interfaces: ClientManagerInterface, CounterMarshallerInterface, and
CounterVerifier.
The ClientManagerInterface provides the methods that are exposed to the user or higher-level applica-
tion. These methods are intentionally very generic to allow for a variety of different applications:
• Object put(File)
• Object get(File)
• boolean contains(File)
The CounterMarshallerInterface defines methods that a CounterMarshaller should provide to help the
Client package data properly for sending to the CounterHost, and verify validity proofs from the Counter-
Host:
• CounterVerifier getCounterVerifier():
Returns a CounterVerifier, which can be used to verify validity proofs received from the CounterHost.
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• ByteArrayableWrapperInterface<? extends ByteArrayable> generateIncNonce(ByteArrayable coun-
terID, PublicKey pk)
• ByteArrayableWrapperInterface<? extends ByteArrayable> generateIncNonce(ByteArrayable coun-
terID, long counterValue, PrivateKey sk):
Returns a nonce that can be used in an increment counter request. The first of these methods is used
for counter registration; the second method is used for counters that have already been registered. See
Section 5.4 for information on counter registration.
• ByteArrayableWrapperInterface<? extends ByteArrayable> generateReadNonce(ByteArrayable coun-
terID):
Returns a nonce that can be used in a read counter request.
• ByteArrayableWrapperInterface<? extends ConfCertificate> generateConfCertificate(ByteArrayable
counterID, ScheduledCertificate opCert, PrivateKey sk):
Generates and signs a confirmation certificate for sending to the CounterHost.
• boolean confirmIncrements():
Informs the Client whether or not confirmation certificates are required to be sent after a successful
increment. Some algorithms, such as the Adaptive algorithm discussed in Sections 3.5 and 5.4, do
require confirmation certificates for each increment.
The CounterVerifier is responsible for verifying the validity proof sent by the CounterHost. It is al-
gorithm and implementation-dependent, and is usually packaged with the CounterMarshaller and should
typically be accessed by CounterMarshaller.getCounterVerifier().
• int verifyRead(CountStamp readCert, ByteArrayable counterID, ByteArrayable nonce, Verification-
Key verifyKey, PublicKey pk)
• int verifyIncrement(CountStamp incCert, ByteArrayable counterID, ByteArrayable nonce, Verifica-
tionKey verifyKey, PublicKey pk):
Verifies the read or increment certificate (CountStamp), according to the information provided. The
VerificationKey is provided by the CounterHost for verifying the signature on the CountStamp. PK is
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the public key of the client, which may be needed for verifying certain structures in the validity proof
(e.g., confirmation certificates).
4.5.2 Log-based Implementation
The logbased package contains a number of Client class modules designed to work with the CounterGateway
and CounterHost logbased classes, as well as the included Simulation module.
The primary class that the Simulation module interacts with is the LogClientManager class. The pur-
pose of the LogClientManager is to provide an entry point for performing statistical analysis of counter
operations and communication. Since storage is highly application-dependent, the LogClientManager does
not communicate with an external StorageManager, but simply stores file data internally. The assumption is
that the cost of communication with the CounterGateway would be in addition to the cost communication
with the storage manager. The feasibility of VMCStore then depends on the ratio of these two costs, which
is a function of the application.
With this goal in mind − to perform statistical analysis of counter operations − LogClientManager
implements StatRecordClientManager, an extension of the ClientManagerInterface. The put() and get()
methods of LogClientManager returns StatRecord objects. See section 4.6 for more information on Sta-
tRecord.
The logbased package also includes a LogCounterMarshallerFactory. The static method getLogCoun-
terMarshallerInstance(LogAlgorithm) can be used to obtain an algorithm-specific instance of the LogCoun-
terMarhaller. The LogAlgorithm enum describes which algorithms are available.
Finally, the logbased package contains a LogVerifier class, which is used to verify LogReadCertificate,
SharedIncCertificate, and VerifiedIncCertificate objects. LogVerifier contains a copy of TPMCountStam-
pVerifier (actually part of counterhost.tpm), which checks the validity of the TPM transport log contained
within the CountStamp.
4.6 Simulation
The Simulation module is not one of the core modules of the VMCStore framework, but is included as
a demonstration of how an application can be built on top of VMCStore. The purpose of the Simulation
module is to perform wide-area multi-client performance analyses of the VMCStore system.
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4.6.1 Operational Overview
Figure 4 provides an overview of the hierarchical structure of the Simulation module. A central simulation
server, running the SimulationCommander, is responsible for conducting, controlling, and collecting data
from the experiments. At the beginning of an experiment, the SimulationCommander contacts an arbitrary
number of SimulationNodes, any or all of which may be running on separate machines. The Simulation-
Commander tells each SimulationNode how many SimulationClients to generate, and any other important
parameters for the experiment (e.g., algorithm type, running time).
As suggested, each SimulationNode can run an arbitrary number of clients. Each SimulationClient runs
in a separate thread, owns a separate instance of LogClientManager, and establishes its own connection with
the counter server.
While the experiment runs, each SimulationClient tracks a number of statistics relating to its opera-
tion and communication with the counter server. When the experiment finishes, the SimulationCommander
asks each SimulationNode to send a report of the simulation data. In turn, each SimulationNode asks each
of its SimulationClients to send a report of its own simulation data. The SimulationNode aggregates the
SimulationClient data into a single report and sends it to the SimulationCommander. Finally, the Simula-
tionCommander aggregates the reports from each SimulationNode and returns the result to the user.
LogCounterGateway also tracks certain statistics during its operation. At the end of an experiment,
the SimulationCommander collects these statistics from the LogCounterGateway and includes them in the
report to the user (see Interfaces).
SimulationNodes can be left running indefinitely on host machines, so multiple experiments can be run
back-to-back. MultiSimulation takes advantage of this construction, providing an interface for running a
series of experiments, by adding an extra layer on top of SimulationCommander.
4.6.2 Interfaces
The Simulation module has a number of communication requirements above and beyond the methods pro-
vided by the CounterGateway interface. These are captured by SimulationGateway:
• String getStats():
Returns the simulation statistics as a comma-separated value (CSV) file represented by a String.
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Figure 4: Detailed diagram of how the Simulation performs wide-scale performance tests of the VMCStore
system. While there is only one simulation server and one counter server, there can be an arbitrary number
of simulation nodes, each with an arbitrary number of clients. A socket-based implementation, included in
VMCStore, can be used in place of the RMI classes.
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• void resetStatistics():
Clears any outstanding statistics remaining on the CounterGateway. This should usually be called
before prepareNewSimulation().
• void prepareNewSimulation(String simID):
Prepares the CounterGateway for a new Simulation, which will be referred to by the given simulation
ID.
A second interface is provided, SimulationCommunicationGateway, the super-interface of Simulation-
Gateway. The relationship between these two interfaces is analogous to the relationship between Counter-
Gateway and CommunicationGateway (see Section 4.3).
4.6.3 Data Collection Structures
The Simulation module uses a number of different structures to collect and aggregate data. In-simulation,
the LogCounterGateway and SimulationClients manage simulation data using the StatPackagedCertificate,
StatRecord and StatRecorder classes. The SimulationCommander uses the MachineStatistics and Group-
Statistics classes to perform the final aggregation.
The StatRecord class simply provides a mapping of Strings to doubles, where the String is a key that
represents the statistic that was recorded, and the double is the recorded value. The StatRecorder class
accepts StatRecord objects, and writes out the data to disk in CSV format, grouping records with the same
key. The StatRecorder writes the data to disk immediately to minimize data loss in case the client crashes.
LogCounterGateway uses StatPackagedCertificates to send simulation data (e.g., TPM operation time)
to the SimulationClient. The StatPackagedCertificate class implements ByteArrayableWrapperInterface,
and holds a StatRecord and a CountStamp.
When the SimulationNode asks a SimulationClient for its statistics, the StatRecorder CSV file is read
verbatim from disk and sent to the SimulationNode as a String. The SimulationNode collects all of these
Strings from its SimulationClients and sends them as a String array to the SimulationCommander. Before
aggregating the statistics, the SimulationCommander writes these individual CSV files to disk for backup.
While the StatRecord class only accepts a single instance of a statistic − reporting a second value under
the same key throws an error − the MachineStatistics aggregates data over all instances of a statistic during
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the run of an experiment. For each key, the MachineStatistics object maintains a DoubleStat (a TPM/J
object), which calculates the mean, standard deviation, etc. of the statistic.
The GroupStatistics class takes aggregation one step further, accepting MachineStatistics and Group-
Statistics objects, and calculating statistics across all given data. The aggregated data is then retrieved using
the toCSVMultiSim() method, which returns a CSV file as a StringBuilder. This CSV file contains not only
the final aggregated statistics, but also calls toCSVMultiSim() recursively on the child GroupStatistics objects
to generate all of the intermediate aggregation statistics.
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5 Theoretical Data Structures in VMCStore
This section provides a bridge between theory and implementation, explaining which data structures corre-
spond to which classes in VMCStore. For more details on the implementation of these classes, please see
Section 4.
5.1 Counters and the Virtual Counter Manager
In VMCStore, the virtual counter manager is implemented within the TPMCountStampHost class. This class
uses TPM/J, a Java-based API for the TPM, to communicate with the TPM, as well as generate timestamps
for the client [34].
Timestamps are derived from a TPM/J data structure called a CountStamp. CountStamps are generic
containers, capable of holding a counter ID, a nonce, and a counter value, as well as other information. A
subclass of CountStamp, called TPMCountStamp, can also hold the transport log of the counter operation
performed at the TPM. The TPMCountStampHost returns a TPMCountStamp as the result of both increment
and read operations.
5.2 Validation Proofs and Confirmation Certificates
The counter manager requires an additional layer to compose the validity proofs required to convince clients
that counter operations were completed correctly. This layer is implemented as the LogCounterManager.
The LogCounterManager is responsible for generating these validity proofs, as well as for verifying client
signatures on incoming counter requests.
Validity proofs are packaged within a data structure called the LogVerificationCertificate. The LogVeri-
ficationCertificate contains the most recent confirmation certificate for the requested counter ID, as well as
a log of all increment operations that have been performed on that TPM since that confirmation certificate
was generated. If no confirmation certificate has yet been received (e.g., because the virtual counter has just
been created), the first increment certificate and the increment log dating back to that certificate is returned.
Note that the actual format of the log may vary from algorithm-to-algorithm; a multiplexed scheme only
requires a subset of the log to prove counter validity. See Section 3.5 for more information.
Confirmation certificates are implemented by the LogConfCertificate class. The LogConfCertificate
contains an instance of LogConfCertData, as well as a client signature over this data. The LogConfCertData
37
contains the counter ID of the virtual counter which is being confirmed, as well as the time the validation
was completed, the last increment time of this counter, and a schedule of legal increment times.
5.3 Operations and Operation Certificates
VMCStore provides three of the four operations presented in the Protocol Overview section (Section 3.3).
Since read-without-validation is not required by any of the algorithms presented, and not useful for proving
validity, it is not provided by VMCStore.
The other three operations, however, are provided. Each one returns a different data structure, as de-
scribed below:
• Increment-without-validation: Returns a SharedIncCertificate, which contains the increment nonce,
TPMCountStamp, and a schedule of legal future increment times. Assuming the schedule is client-
independent, the same increment certificate can be sent to all clients updating in a single timeslot (e.g.,
using the Shared algorithm).
• Increment-with-validation: Returns a ValidatedIncCertificate, which contains a SharedIncCertificate
and a LogVerificationCertificate (see Section 5.2).
• Read-with-validation: Returns a LogReadCertificate, which contains a SharedReadCertificate, a Shared-
IncCertificate (from the last increment of the requested virtual counter), and a LogVerificationCer-
tificate (see Section 5.2). The SharedReadCertificate contains the read nonce, as well as the TPM-
CountStamp for this read operation. (The SharedReadCertificate could be returned by itself to provide
a read-without-validation operation.)
While two increment operations are provided, only one increment operation is allowed for each algo-
rithm. An algorithm can decide whether increments should be validated by setting the validateIncrement
option of the LogCounterHost class.
5.4 Algorithms, Nonces, and Schedules
Four log-based algorithms, derived from the Improvements section (Section 3.5), are provided by VMC-
Store. These algorithms are described below and, except for the Adaptive algorithm, are tested and analyzed
in Section 6:
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• Simple: The original single-client protocol defined in section 3.4.
• Shared: The multi-client increment/read protocol described by the Sharing improvement.
• Multiplexed: The fixed-schedule, multi-client protocol defined by the Time-multiplexing improve-
ment.
• Adaptive: The adaptive-schedule, multi-client protocol defined by the Time-multiplexing improve-
ment.
All schemes, except the Adaptive scheme, use the increment-without-validation protocol. Security con-
cerns are introduced when the schedule is not fixed. The ultimate conclusion is that the virtual counter
manager may only perform increments-with-validation when using the Adaptive scheme. A detailed analy-
sis of the security risks of the adaptive multiplexed protocol can be found in Appendix B of [45].
In VMCStore, all protocols use the same nonce data structure for making increment and read requests
to the virtual counter manager. For reads, this structure is the SharedReadNonce, composed of a list of
NonceWithCounterID structures. Each NonceWithCounterID contains the counter ID of the virtual counter
to be read, as well as an anti-replay nonce.
For increments, the SharedIncNonce class is used. A SharedIncNonce is composed of a list of Nonce-
WithSignature objects, each containing a copy of IncrementNonceData as well as either a public key, or a
signature over the data. If this increment represents the creation of a virtual counter (i.e., the first time the
virtual counter is being incremented), this is indicated by passing a public key with the IncrementNonce-
Data. Otherwise, a signature over the IncrementNonceData is sent to authenticate this increment request to
the virtual counter manager.
The IncrementNonceData contains three pieces of information: the counter ID of the virtual counter
to be incremented, an anti-replay nonce, and the time of the previous increment of the virtual counter. The
previous increment time is included to prevent collisions where two devices of a single client try to increment
a counter at the same time, and one may overwrite the changes of the other. If the virtual counter manager
detects an erroneous previous increment time, it will elect to decline the increment and warn the client that
there is a more recent update.
Note that although the Simple algorithm uses shared nonce structures, its protocol only allows one client
to perform a read or increment at a time. For this algorithm, the shared nonces only contain the individual
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nonce for the virtual counter involved in the operation.
Finally, as mentioned above, the SharedIncCertificate always contains a schedule of legal increment
times. In VMCStore, these schedules are generated by the virtual counter manager and are generated for
every algorithm. All schedule classes implement the Schedule interface, which provides basic functionality
for iterating through and seeking legal increment times.
The Simple, Shared, and Multiplexed algorithms all use an implementation of Schedule called Multi-
plexedSchedule. A MultiplexedSchedule allows an increment on every nth slot, where n is the multiplex
factor. For the Simple and Shared algorithms, n is always 1; for the Multiplexed scheme, n may take any
number, but for the experiments described in Section 6, n is always 5 or 10.
By default, the Adaptive algorithm uses a LinearBackoffSchedule, which works as its name implies, but
the Adaptive algorithm can be customized to use any schedule which implements the Schedule interface.
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6 Results
In this section we will analyze VMCStore and the practicality of its application to real-world scenarios. This
section will first discuss the experiment and its parameters, and then continue with the expected results and
the experimental results that were obtained.
6.1 The Experiment
The goal of the following experiment was to develop an intuition for the practical limits of a trusted storage
application built around a TPM.
The experiment involves two entities: the server, and the clients. The server is a TPM-carrying ma-
chine, which acts as the virtual counter manager for the trusted storage system. The clients each own a
virtual counter, and submits requests to the virtual counter manager for these virtual counters to be read or
incremented, at probabilistically determined intervals.
To determine the limitations of VMCStore, the system measures operational parameters during the run
of the experiment, such as operation time, bandwidth, etc. The hypothesis is that by increasing the number
of clients and analyzing the change in measurements, an approximate upper bound for the number of clients
VMCStore can maintain may be found. Furthermore, performing the experiment under different algorithms
(see Sections 3.5 and 5.4), provides an intuition for potential tradeoffs that can be negotiated to make the
system more practical for global-scale usage.
6.2 Experimental Parameters
This section describes the framework used to perform the experiment described above. This framework was
used to generate all of the results discussed in the following section.
The server (virtual counter manager) was run on the in the Stata Center, on the MIT network (10MB/s),
using a Gateway M-465 laptop. This laptop was running Linux, and contained a 1.83 GHz Core Duo CPU,
2GB RAM, and an ST Micro TPM 1.2 chip.
The clients were run on the PlanetLab network [42]. Using the model presented in Figure 4, 150 ma-
chines from this network were selected to act as SimulationNodes for the experiments. The Simulation-
Clients were evenly distributed across these SimulationNodes. All communication was managed using
VMCStore’s RMI communication classes (see Section 4.4).
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All digital signatures were produced using 2048-bit RSA keys, and hashing was done using SHA-1. We
used TPM/J [34] as a Java interface to the TPM. Measurements showed that with the ST Micro TPM chip,
an IncSign operation required about 1.3 seconds. A ReadSign operation was found to take roughly the same
amount of time. We further found that the ST Micro chip throttles IncSign operations such that we could
only execute one at most every 2.15 seconds.
The SimulationClients were run using the PoissonScheduler class. At runtime, this class creates a sched-
ule of read and increment operations for the duration of the experiment. Operations times were determined
over a Poisson distribution with a frequency of one operation every 30 seconds. Read and increment opera-
tions were selected with equal probability so that, on average, we would expect one increment and one read
per client per minute. The schedule of client requests is generated at the beginning of the experiment. If a
client misses a request deadline, because a previous request took too long, the next request is made as soon
as the previous request returns.
The counter server was run as a multi-threaded application. Client requests were handled as independent
threads, which were managed through the use of synchronized blocks, lists and queues. Server operations
were handled on a separate thread from network communication, so that the TPM could perform operations
in parallel with client requests and the sending of read and increment certificate responses. Each client
also had a personal TCP socket connection with the server, so that requests and responses could be sent in
parallel, maximizing the usage of the server network.
All experiments were run for a duration of 35 minutes. The first five minutes was used as a warm-up
time to allow virtual counters to be initialized. The statistics represented below were derived from the final
30 minutes of the experiment. Experiments were conducted using the Simple algorithm, Shared algorithm,
and Multiplexed algorithm (for multiplex values of 5 and 10). The Adaptive algorithm was not tested, as it
is dependent on client request patterns, which are application-dependent.
6.3 Experimental Results
We begin with an analysis of the original algorithm presented in Section 3.4, and then continue by analyzing
the extensions listed in Sections 3.5 and 5.4.
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6.3.1 Operational Efficiency
To determine when the system saturates, we will use the idea of operational efficiency. We define opera-
tional efficiency to be the ratio of the number of operations actually completed to the expected number of
operation requests, in an experiment:
γ =
operationscompleted
requestsexpected
If each client makes one operation request on average every 30 seconds, and all experiments run for 30
minutes, we should expect each client to request approximately 60 operations during the experiment. If an
experiment saturates, the client should fall behind its request schedule and fail to complete all 60 operations.
Therefore, according to this metric, γ ≈ 1 should indicate that the system is practical and unsaturated
(i.e., the server is able to complete all requested operation), while γ < 1 should indicate that the system is
impractical and overloaded (i.e., unable to complete all of the client requests).
From the client’s perspective, an overloaded server means that operations are consistently taking longer
that 30 seconds to complete. Since the client makes requests on average every 30 seconds, and the request
schedule is generated ahead of time, this means that at some point requests will be late. As mentioned in
the Experimental Parameters section, a client will only send in a late request when it receives the result
from the previous request. However, since the server is overloaded, future requests will also take more than
30 seconds to complete. This leads to a snowballing effect so that the lateness of later requests will grow
without bound.
6.3.2 Simple
The Simple algorithm allows only a single user to increment or read her virtual counter at any given timeslot.
Intuitively, if the time that a client has to wait to perform an operation is greater than the average operation
frequency defined by its Poisson process, the client should see a backlog of operations, and the system
should saturate. By this intuition, we should expect the TPM to be the bottleneck for the Simple algorithm
since, as mentioned above, the ST Micro TPM requires approximately 1.3 seconds to perform any given
increment or read operation. Since clients perform, on average, one operation every 30 seconds, we expect
the upper bound of the Simple algorithm system to be approximately 30s/1.3s ≈ 23 clients.
Figure 5 shows the operational efficiency of the VMCStore system using the Simple algorithm, for a
43
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Number of clients
O
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
a
l 
e
ff
ic
ie
n
c
y
Figure 5: Operational efficiency of the Simple algorithm, for various clients. The decrease in efficiency
suggests that the system’s saturation point has been reached.
range of 4 to 30 clients. We can see from the graph that the efficiency of the Simple algorithm hovers around
1 until the number of clients reaches the low-to-mid 20’s. The deviation in the smaller number of clients is
probably within expectation; later results with many more clients tend to be much tighter. We also notice
that the efficiency of the algorithm starts to drop below 1 around 22-24 clients, suggesting the system is
becoming overloaded. This agrees with our expected saturation point of about 23 clients.
Looking at the data from another perspective, Figure 6 shows the total number of operations performed
for each of these experiments. Since we expect the TPM to be the bottleneck, there should be an absolute
limit to the number of operations it can perform, about 1800s/1.3s ≈ 1384 operations. While the number of
operations grows linearly in the graph until we reach 20 to 22 clients, the TPM definitely appears to saturate
at this point. As the number of clients continues to increase, the TPM approaches the maximum number of
operations it can possibly support in 30 minutes; the maximum number measured was 1368 operations.
Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the average size of the increment and read certificates, per client, for each
of the experiments. The Simple algorithm uses the increment without validation protocol to perform its
increments. Since the size of the certificate produced by this protocol grows linearly with the number of
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Figure 6: Total operations performed by the Simple algorithm, for various clients. As the number of clients
increases, we see the TPM reach the limit for the number of operations it can perform in the timeframe of
the experiment.
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Figure 7: Average certificate size per increment of the Simple algorithm, for various clients.
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concurrently incrementing clients, and we only allow one client to increment its counter during any given
timeslot, the certificate should have approximately constant size, as confirmed in Figure 7.
On the other hand, the Simple algorithm uses the read with validation protocol for all read operations.
We recall that the read certificate will contain a validity proof, as well as the read nonce. The validity proof
contains a log of increment certificates since the last confirmation certificate was sent to the server. Since
the Simple algorithm sends a confirmation certificate after each read, we expect the validity proof to grow
with the number of expected increments between the time a client performs two reads. Since only one client
can read or increment at a time, we should expect the validity proof to grow linearly with the number of
clients. The read nonce has a constant size, since only one client can increment at a time, so the entire read
certificate size should be an affine function that grows with the number of clients.
Indeed, the graph in Figure 8 confirms this relationship. There are some anomalies as the number of
clients reaches saturation. These anomalies may be explained by the way the Simple algorithm queues
increments and reads; while increment requests are strictly processed in FIFO order, reads are performed
on-demand in a pseudo-random order (e.g., at the whim of the Java thread manager). Unlike the Shared
and Multiplexed algorithms, it is possible for multiple consecutive reads to be processed, even if there is an
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Figure 8: Average certificate size per read of the Simple algorithm, for various clients.
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increment request in the queue.
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Figure 9: Average time spent by a client at the server during an increment of the Simple algorithm, for
various clients.
Finally, for completeness, we present Figures 9 and 10, showing the average time that a client thread
spends on the server during an increment of read operation. That is, these graphs represent the time that a
client thread waits at the server for its operation to proceed, plus the TPM operation time. Network transit
time is not included in these graphs. (The network bandwidth of the clients was not standardized, and proved
a difficult parameter to use as a performance metric.)
To understand these graphs, consider three regions. If the Simple algorithm is well under-saturated (i.e.,
the server can easily handle all the requests), then we should expect few conflicting requests on the server,
and a client should be able to perform its operation with minimal waiting time (i.e., close to the 1.3s required
for the TPM time). This is the 4 to 12 client region, where both read and increment operations take under 2
seconds.
As the number of clients approaches saturation, we should expect many more conflicting client requests.
Clients have a higher probability of having to wait for other clients to finish their operations, and the server
time increases. This second region would be represented around the range of 16 to 20 clients.
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Finally, as the server hits saturation, we expect the TPM to be processing operations all the time. While
each client still schedules to make one request every 30s on average, the increase in clients means that over
a 30s period, the total number of request would tally to more than 30s of work. This implies that a wait
queue will build up on the server. As soon as a client finishes its operation, if it has missed the deadline for
the next operation, it will immediately send the request to the server, adding itself to the wait queue.
In this third region, then, the size of the wait queue grows linearly with the number of clients. Since only
one client is processed at a time, this leads to a linear wait time on the server, and the (approximately) linear
behavior we see in the region with 22+ clients. (We are unable to explain the anomaly in the read time for
32 clients, at this time.)
It may seem surprising at first that the average server increment time is significantly higher than the
average server read time. Once again, this is probably a result of increments and reads being handled asym-
metrically, and how it is possible for multiple reads to be processed between two consecutive increments.
Considering the increment time alone, however, if all clients were performing increments, with 30 clients
we would expect to have to wait 29 ∗ 1.3s = 37.7s on the server, before we can process our increment. If
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Figure 10: Average time spent by a client at the server during a read of the Simple algorithm, for various
clients.
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reads take higher priority than writes, it is possible that this wait time will increase even further. While this is
difficult to quantify theoretically, since the Java thread manager is non-deterministic, given this explanation,
the 62.6s wait time for increments in the 30-client experiment may make more sense.
To summarize our analysis of the Simple algorithm, we remind the reader of the results of Figures 5 and
6, which suggests that the TPM reaches a limit for the number of operations it can perform. Figures 9 and
10 provided further evidence that the Simple algorithm reaches a point where it cannot process all of the
client requests in a timely matter, resulting in the build-up of wait queues at the server. Both of these results
suggest that the Simple algorithm can only manage about 20 to 22 clients, close to our original estimate of
23 clients.
The next section will demonstrate how TPM sharing can be used to move the system bottleneck from
the TPM to the network, significantly increasing the number of clients we can manage.
6.3.3 Shared
As shown in the previous section, the TPM serves as the bottleneck for the Simple algorithm limiting the
number of clients it can manage to about 20. We will show that by allowing multiple clients to be processed
for each TPM increment or read, the Shared algorithm increases the number of clients that can be managed,
and moves the bottleneck to the network.
Figure 11 shows the operational efficiency of the Shared algorithm for various numbers of clients. As can
be seen from this graph, the Shared algorithm maintains an efficiency of near 1 until the number of clients
reaches between 300 and 400, at which point the system saturates, and the efficiency sharply decreases.
Figure 12 provides another view of this data, showing the total number of operations performed by the
Shared algorithm for each experiment. While this graph is a little misleading, because the data points are
spread far apart, we can make three observations:
a Until the system saturates, the number of operations performed grows linearly with the number of
clients,
b The system saturates somewhere between 300 and 500 clients, and
c Adding more clients to a saturated system actually decreases the number of operations the system can
perform.
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Figure 11: Operational efficiency of the Shared algorithm, for various clients. Notice that the Shared algo-
rithm can support many more clients than the Simple algorithm before the system becomes saturated and the
efficiency decreases.
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Figure 12: Total operations performed by the Shared algorithm, for various clients. Once again, we see a
peek in the number of operations the system can perform somewhere between 300 to 500 clients.
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This third point will be expanded upon in the analysis of the following graphs.
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Figure 13: Average certificate size per client, per increment of the Shared algorithm, for various clients.
Figures 13 and 14 show the average increment and read certificate sizes per client, per operation of the
Shared algorithm. Starting with the increment certificates, we first note that the Shared algorithm uses the
increment without validation protocol. Since the VMCStore shared nonce grows linearly with respect to
the number of concurrently incrementing clients, we should expect the graph of the size of the increment
certificate to be affine. Indeed, until the system hits saturation, we can see from Figure 13 that the graph
does grow as expected.
Once the system hits saturation, requests take more than 30s to complete. Recall that clients will only
send a request with a missed deadline once the result of the previous request is returned from the server.
The frequency at which a client can make requests is then bounded by the time it takes for operations to
complete in an overloaded system. This implies that request frequency of saturated clients decreases, and
that a saturated client’s operations are spread over a longer period.
The expected number of concurrently operating clients is given by number of clients
operation period
. When not in satu-
ration, the expected operation period is 30s, and the number of concurrently operating clients grows linearly
with the total number of clients. In saturation, the operation period is no longer a constant, but dependent
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on the time it takes for operations to return, which is a function of the number of clients, and the network
bandwidth, among other things. While it is difficult to predict the expected operation period when the sys-
tem is overloaded, it will be greater than 30s, so the number of concurrently operating clients grows slower
than in the unsaturated region as seen in Figure 13.
In Figure 14, we once again see a linear relation between the number of clients and the size of the
read certificate. While this is a read with validation certificate, until we hit saturation we expect a constant
number of increments between two consecutive reads of the client. The linear behavior is a result of the
shared read nonce, which grows linearly with the number of concurrently reading clients. Comparing this
graph with Figure 8, we notice that although both these graphs grow linearly with the number of clients, the
read certificate size grows much more slowly int the Shared algorithm than in the Simple algorithm. This is
because the nonces included in the shared nonce (which increase in the Shared algorithm) are much smaller
than the increment certificates added to the validity proofs (which increase in the Simple algorithm).
While the validity proof size is constant when the system is not saturated, once the Shared algorithm
hits saturation, a client’s read frequency decreases, and the period between consecutive reads of that client
increases. Now, the validity proof size is not constant, but increases as a function of the time it takes for an
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Figure 14: Average certificate size per client, per read of the Shared algorithm, for various clients.
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operation to return. Even though the shared nonce size will decrease because fewer clients read concurrently
(see above), this is overshadowed by the increase in the proof size, leading to the exploding read certificate
sizes seen in the saturated regions of Figure 14.
Finally, note that if the network is saturated, then increasing the size of the read certificates should
decrease the total number of read operations we can perform. Looking at Figure 12 once again, we notice
that the number of operations does decrease in the saturated region, providing us with evidence that the
network is the bottleneck in a Shared system.
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Figure 15: Average time spent by a client at the server during an increment of the Shared algorithm, for
various clients.
Figures 15 and 16 present the average time that a client thread is present on the server during an incre-
ment or read operation. Once again, we remind the reader that this only includes waiting and operation time
on the server, not network transfer time. Since, in the Shared algorithm, all requested reads or increments are
processed concurrently, we should expect the average server time to be nearly constant, even in saturation.
This time will include the operation time (1.3s for both increments and reads), as well as some wait time.
Both Figure 15 and 16 match these expected results. The average read and increment time on the server
for all experiments − even those in saturation − was in the range 2.68s to 3.03s, reflecting some wait time
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and processing time on top of the TPM operation time.
Comparing these graphs with the Simple results (Figures 9 and 10), we see a striking difference. In the
Simple algorithm, we know the TPM was the bottleneck, and that the server operation time was proportional
to the number of clients. However, for the Shared algorithm, it is clear from these graphs that the TPM is
no longer the bottleneck. Indeed, it is unlikely the CPU is the bottleneck either, because we would expect
the increased processing time to be reflected in Figures 15 and 16.
Our conclusion is that the network becomes the bottleneck for the Shared algorithm. Saturation implies
that a client is no longer able to perform operations at its expected rate of once every 30s. However, Figures
15 and 16 show that the client spends only a few seconds waiting and operating on the server. This implies
that the bottleneck is either the client itself, or somewhere between the server and the client. It is improb-
able that the client is the bottleneck, since the major processing operation on the client is probably proof
verification, and the proof size remains constant until saturation is reached.
However, as shown in Figures 13 and 14, certificate size grow linearly with the number of clients. Also,
we see from Figure 12 that the number of operations performed grows linearly with the number of clients.
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Figure 16: Average time spent by a client at the server during a read of the Shared algorithm, for various
clients.
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This implies that the network bandwidth usage grows quadratically with the number of clients. Experiments
showed that the server would typically send around 3.0GB to 3.5GB data over 30-minute experiments near
saturation. It seems likely that the network bandwidth was reaching saturation, and serves as the bottleneck
for the Shared algorithm.
In summary, we have shown that by processing client reads and increments concurrently, the Shared
algorithm removes the TPM bottleneck and improves the number of clients it can manage to around 400. We
have also shown that it is likely that the network bandwidth is now the bottleneck of the system. Under this
assumption, we will now demonstrate how we can use multiplexing to reduce the network load, increasing
the number of clients we can handle at the expense of longer server wait times.
6.3.4 Multiplexed
The previous section demonstrated how the Shared algorithm uses concurrent processing of clients to shift
the bottleneck of the system from the TPM to the network bandwidth, increasing the number of clients that
can be managed. As discussed in Section 3.5, client increment requests can be multiplexed to reduce the
size of the validity proof, at the expense of increased server wait times. This section will demonstrate the
results of these modifications, applied by the Multiplexed algorithm.
Two versions of the Multiplexed algorithm were run for the experiments in this section: one with a
multiplex factor of 5 (Multiplexed-5), and one with a multiplex factor of 10 (Multiplexed-10). In all of
the following graphs, the results for these two experiments are graphed against the result of the Shared
algorithm, which is equivalent to the Multiplexed algorithm with a factor of 1.
Intuitively, an increased multiplex factor will result in smaller validity proofs, which should allow us to
transmit proofs to more clients. However, as the nonce size increases linearly with the number of clients,
and since the shared nonce is sent to each client, the bandwidth from nonces will increase quadratically
as the number of clients increase. So while the decreased proof size will allow us to handle more clients,
the increased nonce size, for both reads and increments, will limit this improvement. Furthermore, if the
multiplex factor causes the operation time to be longer than the operation frequency, this will cause the
system to saturate.
This suggests that there is an optimal multiplex factor for a given set of client and bandwidth parameters.
We do not present a method for computing that here, but leave it as an open research topic. Indeed, even for
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the experiments below, we do not know the optimal multiplex factor.
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Figure 17: Comparison of the operational efficiency of the Multiplexed and Shared algorithms, for various
clients.
Figures 17 and 18 compare the operational efficiency and total operations performed by the Shared
and Multiplexed algorithms. As seen in Figure 17, the efficiency of the Multiplexed-5 algorithm breaks
around 700 to 800 clients, while the Multiplexed-10 algorithm breaks around 900 to 1000 clients. Looking
at the total operation results in Figure 18, we see roughly the same behavior. As expected, the Multiplexed
algorithms can handle more clients than the Shared algorithm, but the relation is not linear with respect to
the multiplex factor.
Figures 19 and 20 display the average increment and read certificate sizes for the Multiplexed algorithms.
We note first that all increments are increments without validation, and all reads are reads with validation.
Looking first at the increment certificate sizes in Figure 19, we notice that, in unsaturated regions, there is
a tight linear relationship between the number of clients and the increment certificate size. We remind the
reader that this is because the increment certificate contains a shared nonce, the size of which is directly
proportional to the number of concurrently incrementing clients, which itself is proportional to the total
number of clients. Regarding the behavior in the saturated region, we remind the reader that, while the
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Figure 18: Comparison of the total operations performed by the Multiplexed and Shared algorithms, for
various clients.
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Number of clients
In
c
re
m
e
n
t 
c
e
rt
if
ic
a
te
 s
iz
e
 (
k
B
)
Shared
Multiplexed-5
Multiplexed-10
Figure 19: Comparison of the average certificate size per client, per increment of the Multiplexed and Shared
algorithms, for various clients.
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number of clients increases, the client increment frequency decreases. See the discussion of Figure 13 for
more details.
Regarding the read certificate sizes in Figure 20, we first notice that in the unsaturated region for all three
curves, read certificate sizes for all three algorithms grow linearly, and the Multiplexed algorithms grow
significantly more slowly than the Shared algorithm. The read certificate size is not inversely proportional
to the multiplex factor, but this is expected, since the read certificate contains a shared nonce, which grows
linearly with the number of clients and is roughly the same for all three algorithms.
Indeed, this growing shared nonce also means that the benefit factor of the multiplexing decreases as the
number of clients increases: with 100 clients, the Shared read certificate is 5.65x larger than the Multiplexed-
10 certificate; at 400 clients, this factor has been reduced to 3.66x. This is one of the reasons why the number
of clients the Multiplexed algorithm can handle does not scale linearly with the multiplex factor.
Finally, we present Figures 21 and 22, representing the average client increment and read times, mea-
sured at the server. We remind the reader that this includes wait time at the server and TPM operation time,
but no network transfer time. We expect the server increment time to scale approximately linearly with the
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Figure 20: Comparison of the average certificate size per client, per read of the Multiplexed and Shared
algorithms, for various clients.
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Figure 21: Comparison of the average time spent by a client at the server during an increment of the Multi-
plexed and Shared algorithms, for various clients.
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Figure 22: Comparison of the average time spent by a client at the server during a read of the Multiplexed
and Shared algorithms, for various clients.
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multiplex factor. However, because reads are not constrained by multiplexing, the server read time should
be the same for the Multiplexed algorithm as for the Shared algorithm.
Looking first at Figure 21, we first see that increments in the Multiplexed algorithms take significantly
more time on the server than increments for the Shared algorithm. While this does not appear to be a linear
relationship at first, we point out that the relationship should actually be affine: the wait time should increase
linearly with the multiplex factor, but the 1.3s TPM increment time is constant. Ignoring the increment time,
the Shared algorithm then takes≈ 1.4s, while Multiplexed-5 takes≈ 7.3s, and Multiplexed-10 takes ≈ 16.7s.
Furthermore, we notice that the server increment times are still mostly independent of the number of
clients. We recall that this is because the TPM is no longer the bottleneck of the system, but all requested
reads or increments can be processed concurrently.
Multiplexed-10 does demonstrate abnormal behavior above 1000 clients. We note that this is in its
saturated region, but do not fully understand the cause of this behavior.
Finally, we look at the average server read times in Figure 22. As expected, the server read times for
all three algorithms are roughly the same. The Multiplexed-10 algorithm again showed abnormal behavior
above 1000 clients, but we are not able to explain this at this time.
In summary, we have demonstrated how the Multiplexed algorithm can multiplex client increments to
increase the number of clients that VMCStore can manage. By increasing the multiplex factor, the Multi-
plexed algorithm can decrease the size of validity proofs, relieving network bandwidth pressures, but at the
cost of increasing the time that client increments have to wait at the server. For a given system, the optimal
multiplex factor would need to be analyzed by considering the number of clients, the available network
bandwidth, the application, and client access patterns.
6.4 Conclusion
The Shared and Multiplexed algorithms provide a significant improvement over the Simple algorithm, in
terms of the upper bound for number of clients that can be supported, by moving the bottleneck of the
system from the TPM to the network.
Still, the question remains, how practical would a VMCStore-like trusted storage system be in the real
world? From the server perspective, we argue that this largely depends on the available network bandwidth.
From the client perspective, there are two main issues: the certificate size, and the server operation time.
60
These experiments were run under the observation that any time or bandwidth incurred during communi-
cation with the virtual counter manager would be on top of the costs of communicating with the storage
server. The practicality of the system is then dependent on the parameters of the counter server, as well as
the details of the storage system.
For example, if client is using the storage system for managing large files (e.g. 10MB+), the overhead of
spending a few seconds at the virtual counter manager and retrieving an 80kB certificate may be acceptable.
However, if the client is using the storage system to store many small files, maintaining a virtual counter for
each file may be prohibitive.
In conclusion, we have shown that it is possible to build a trusted storage system on an untrusted server,
around a TPM. Furthermore, we believe that the results of the experiments we have performed on the VM-
CStore system suggest that a TPM-based trusted storage system may be practical for certain applications,
even for a relatively large number of clients.
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7 Future Work and Conclusions
While the VMCStore framework provides preliminary evidence that the TPM could be used as the basis for
a trusted storage system, many research areas are still open that would make such a system more practical.
As noted in Section 6, the network bandwidth tends to be the system bottleneck as the number of clients
increases. Currently, the network output grows quadratically with the number of concurrent clients. One
improvement for the shared nonces would be to use an authenticated hash tree [28] as opposed to the flat log
of individual nonces which is currently used. While this would not reduce proof size significantly, the nonce
sizes would only grow O(log n) with the number of clients, as opposed to their current linear relation.
The required network bandwidth could also be reduced by optimizing the read and increment certificates,
reducing them to a minimal set of required information. In particular, the current TPM/J CountStamp data
structure contains unnecessary redundant data (e.g., it contains both the encrypted and unencrypted forms
of the increment command and its result). It may be possible to optimize certain VMCStore data structures
as well: the LogReadCertificate probably does not need to return the SharedIncCertificate of the most recent
increment if the most recent confirmation certificate is returned. Finally, we suspect there may be more
efficient ways, instead of relying on Java serialization, to transfer the VMCStore data structures over the
network.
Finally, while VMCStore provides tamper-evident trusted storage, it provides little-to-no protection
against failures and denial-of-service attacks. A TPM-based trusted storage system would require a layer
of replication to become commercially feasible. One such replication scheme, which would transform
VMCStore from a tamper-evident to a temper-tolerant system, can be found in Appendix C of [45].
In conclusion, this thesis has presented VMCStore, a framework for a trusted storage system based solely
on trusting a TPM 1.2. Preliminary experimental results, performed on PlanetLab, have demonstrated that
such a system could be used to implement and manage virtual monotonic counters, providing trusted storage
for a significant number of clients. VMCStore uses the concept of log-based validation proofs to prove the
validity of its counters. A variety of algorithms based on these log-based validation proofs were developed
and tested, demonstrating flexibility in the system, bottlenecks and potential areas of improvement.
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